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13 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,  
12 December 1979 (U)

1. I discussed the White Paper. I mentioned to him that the President had raised this with me and that I had expressed my concerns as to what we could put in such a paper. Brzezinski seemed very supportive of this. I pointed out we could not get into such things and emerge with any benefit to ourselves. He simply indicated we should participate in the group but be very circumspect as to what we let get into a paper that would be circulated around. (S)

2. I asked his permission to vet with some of our analysts a very serious subject he had told me about. He gave me permission to set up an appointment for Bruce Clarke, the DDCI and Dick Lehman to see me not later than Thursday to discuss how we go about that. (S)

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4. I told him about the establishment of the National Intelligence Council. (U)

5. I complained to him about the IOB problem and the fact that he had sort of pushed it off on us. I told him we would do what we could on Friday with them, but that I would try to come into him with some paper saying we had to have a clarification between the IOB, the President, and Brzezinski/Turner as to just what the President wanted disclosed. After the IOB meeting I ought to get some kind of a memo to Brzezinski on this. (S)

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*Sensitive items contained  
in separate memo filed  
DCI files only*

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6. I delivered the intelligence assessment on Soviet/American relations. Brzezinski asked me if this was the one that took a position one way and then took a position the other way about which he has sent me a memo criticizing its wishy-washiness. I said I hadn't seen that memo, at least I didn't recall it, and didn't think it was about this one. Let me know. (C)

7. Brzezinski also said he just sent me a memo with a bunch of specific questions about Khomeini, Afghanistan, etc. What he is getting at, I believe, is that he is concerned at what else is going on around the world while we are watching Iran. In particular, he has a concern that the Soviets have made a decision that the opportunities for mischief are so attractive today that they are willing to forego the impact that their probings will have on relations with us. He thinks they have discounted the possibility of SALT in any event. I told him I didn't quite go that far at this time. I still thought they would have some hope for SALT and would feel that they could wait a few more months before pushing these initiatives in order to see if they couldn't get SALT through first. I'd like to see what [ ] feels about this. (S)

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

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